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Executive Summary
Friends of the South Slope Cutthroat, Inc., (FSSC), the appel-
lant in this action, brought suit against Capitol City, New Union
under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33
U.S.C. § 1365, alleging that Capitol City, New Union had violated
section 301, the CWA's prohibition against discharge of pollutants
without a permit. Specifically, FSSC claimed that Capitol City
had improperly discharged a pollutant into navigable waters
when it diverted silt-laden water from the turbid Torpid River to
the pristine Rapid River without a permit. The State of New
Union intervened on behalf of FSSC to maintain the law suit, but
joined Capitol City on all other issues. In the present appeal,
FSSC seeks to overturn the District Court's summary judgment
grant in favor of Capitol City on all three issues and to reverse the
District Court's grant of intervention to the State of New Union.
Located on the relatively arid south slope of the Front Moun-
tains, Capitol City is the capitol and the largest city in the State of
New Union. The city has been involved in a long tradition of di-
verting water from the wet north slope region of the Front Moun-
tains in order to supply its population with an adequate water
supply. Specifically, and complained of here, Capitol City has di-
verted water from the Torpid River located on the north slope to
the Rapid River on the south slope through the Torpid Aqueduct.
The city has met all requisite state standards and obtained per-
mits from all the relevant state authorities for water allocation
and use.
The Rapid River is a fast flowing, clear-water river that sup-
ported a population of native South Slope Cutthroat Trout. As a
result of the diversion of water from the turbid Torpid River to the
pristine Rapid River, silt-laden water has entered the Rapid
River, and the trout no longer thrive in the area. The trout still
live in the waters of the Rapid River extending from the diversion
upstream to the headwaters of the river. Nelson Spinner and
Newton Creel, members of FSSC, allege that as a result of the silt-
laden water, which began on August 15, 2003, the trout no longer
exist and they can no longer fish in the area. They can still fish
upstream or on neighboring streams located further from the
homes than the Rapid River.
New Union filed a motion to intervene as of right pursuant to
33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2) and both original parties, FSSC and Capitol
City opposed the intervention. The District Court granted the mo-
20051 383
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tion. Capitol City sought summary judgment on three issues
against FSSC, arguing that plaintiff, FSSC, had not 1) given
proper notice of their intent to sue under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A), 2) proven that the diversion of the water from the
Torpid River to the Rapid River added a pollutant to a navigable
water from a point source as defined in 33 U.S.C. § 1251, and 3)
shown that the diversion was within the jurisdiction of the CWA
under 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). The District Court granted summary
judgment on all three issues in favor of Capitol City. The court
relied on the wording of the statute as evidence of congressional
intent and found that the statute treats states as the equivalent of
the United States. The court also found that the plaintiff must
strictly comply with the notice requirement and held that because
an environmental organization does not have standing to sue on
its own, but rather, only on behalf of its injured members. Such
members are the real plaintiffs and hence must be named in the
notice pursuant to the notice requirements outlined in the regula-
tions at 40 C.F.R. § 135.3. The District Court also held that Capi-
tol City did not violate 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) that prohibits the
discharge of any pollutant without a permit or in violation of a
permit limitation. The court found that the elements of the defini-
tion of "discharge of pollutant" had not been met because pollu-
tants had not been added to the Rapid River. The District Court
also granted summary judgment on the third issue, finding that
the EPA had no authority under the CWA to regulate water qual-
ity in this situation because such action would abrogate the state
authority to allocate water use, violating 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g).
This Court must rule on four issues. First, the Court must
determine if the District Court erred in granting New Union's mo-
tion to intervene by right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). FSSC con-
tends that New Union may not intervene under statutory
authorization of intervention by the United States because New
Union is not the United States. New Union argues that because
the CWA envisions that states implement the statute instead of
EPA, states should be treated as the United States for purposes of
intervention in citizen suits.
Second, the Court must determine if the District Court erred
in granting Capitol City's motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the court lacked jurisdiction over the case because
FSSC's members, Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel, failed to give
proper notice of their intent to sue under 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A). FSSC argues that an environmental organization
[Vol. 22384
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/5
BENCH MEMORANDUM
may bring suit on behalf of its non-named members, and such
members need not be named in the notice, because they are not
parties to the suit. Capitol City argues that because to achieve
standing FSSC must demonstrate that one or more of its members
suffered injury as a result of defendant's actions, such members
serve as the plaintiffs and therefore must be named in the notice.
Third, the Court must decide whether the District Court
erred in granting Capitol City's motion for summary judgment
that Capitol City's diversion of silt-laden waters from the Torpid
River to the pristine Rapid River without a permit did not violate
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). FSSC contends that the court erroneously
granted summary judgment because the Rapid River is a tribu-
tary of a navigable water and therefore constitutes a navigable
water for purposes of the CWA. Additionally, FSSC contends that
intermittent streams that are connected to navigable waters, even
in the past, remain navigable waters for purposes of the CWA.
FSSC further contends that the transfer of polluted water from
one water body to another by way of a discharge through a point
source violates the CWA prohibition against the "addition" of a
"pollutant" to "navigable waters." FSSC argues that the Rapid
River and the Torpid River are distinctly separate water bodies
and therefore a diversion from one to the other of polluted water
constitutes a violation of the Clean Water Act. Capitol City and
New Union argue that the District Court properly granted sum-
mary judgment because Rapid River is no longer a tributary of the
navigable Platte River and therefore does not constitute a naviga-
ble water. Furthermore, appellees argue that because the Rapid
River is merely a former intermittent navigable water and is no
longer annually connected to navigable waters, it escapes CWA ju-
risdiction. Capitol City and New Union also argue that the diver-
sion did not constitute a discharge of pollutants because 1) there
was no addition of polluted waters, 2) the addition of pollutants to
navigable water occurred when silt first entered the Torpid River,
a navigable water, not when silt flowed from the Torpid to the
Rapid River, and 3) as a public policy matter, imposition of
NPDES requirements on water diversions in western states would
be impractical and burdensome.
Fourth, the Court must decide whether the District Court
erred in granting Capitol City's motion for summary judgment
that New Union's granting of a permit for Capitol City's diversion
of the Torpid River to the Rapid River as a part of the state's con-
trol over water ownership, use and allocation obviated application
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of the CWA to the diversion. FSSC argues that CWA § 101(g) con-
templates federal regulation of water quality and is not a bar to
federal water quality regulation of waters being allocated under
state authority. Capitol City and New Union ask the Court to ap-
ply the plain meaning of the statutory language, specifying that
state authority over water allocation shall not be obviated.
No parties to the law suit nor the court below addressed the
question of standing. Because the issue of standing is jurisdic-
tional, the Court may interrogate the parties as to its require-
ments. Furthermore, the Court must raise the issue of standing
sua sponte since it goes to the power of the Court's jurisdiction.
Because Spinner and Creel are purely recreational fishermen (not
eating the fish they catch) and continue to fish nearby, it can be
asked whether they are sufficiently injured to establish standing.
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Suggested Questions For the Judges
Issue 1: Intervention.
What policy reasons suggest that a state should have the right to
intervene in a CWA citizen suit? Should these policy considera-
tions override the plain language of the statute?
Should the plain language of a statute always persuade courts of
the statutory meaning? Should legislative history of the statute
always persuade the courts of the statutory meaning?
When may the court grant permissive intervention pursuant to
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 24(a)(2)?
If the state is not permitted to intervene, will the states' role as
primary enforcers of the CWA be undermined? Furthermore, if
the state is prevented from intervention will this decision be con-
sistent with the Act's preservation of state enforcement
discretion?
Issue 2: Notice.
What are the two most commonly cited purposes supporting provi-
sion of proper notice prior to a citizen suit?
How does proper prior notice of a citizen suit ensure that congres-
sional intent will be met, namely that citizen suits supplement
rather than supplant government enforcement action?
Is the notice requirement jurisdictional in nature or merely a
mandatory condition precedent to filing a citizen suit? Is there a
difference and if so, does it matter?
If the "person" giving notice of intent to sue is actually FSSC on
behalf of its many non-named members, what purpose would it
serve to include the names of the injured parties Nelson Spinner
and Newton Creel? Is it a violation of the notice regulation to fail
to include these names, as Capitol City argues, or is it related to
something broader, such as the standing requirement? Explain.
Issue 3: "Navigability" and "Addition."
What was the reasoning for U.S. v. Appalachian Electric Power
Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), holding that a water body once found
navigable will remain navigable? Has Appalachian been over-
ruled? (This point is significant because although the Rapid River
is no longer connected to the navigable Platte River as a conse-
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quence of the dam and reservoir, it was historically connected and
therefore was considered navigable but raising the question of
whether it is still navigable.)
Must the Torpid River and the Rapid River be considered distinct
water bodies for the diversion of silt-laden water from one to the
other to be considered a "discharge of pollutants?"
In what ways, if any, is application of an "unitary waters" theory
consistent with or contrary to the structure of the CWA and the
programs already administered by the EPA and approved states?
Issue 4: Federal Obviation of State Authority to Allocate
Waters.
Does federal water pollution control law disrupt the delicate bal-
ance of federalism in state control of water use and allocation? To
what degree, if any, should the federal government have control
over water quality issues, even where some state authority to allo-
cate water is obviated?
A general permit has been suggested as one remedy to the admin-
istrative burden that might fall on western states if they are re-
quired to obtain an NPDES permit for every diversion of water.
In what ways does this solution meet or fail to meet the goals of
the CWA? Is this an adequate solution? Suggest other
alternatives.
Additional Questions.
The judges may wish to ask questions about the standing of FSSC
to bring this law suit.
Is the court required to raise a standing issue sua sponte since
neither the lower court nor the present litigants have raised the
issue? Why? Is it jurisdictional? Does this relate to any other
issues presented, such as the notice requirement and the naming
issues that arise there? Are Spinner and Creel injured if they
don't eat the fish they catch and can still catch fish nearby?
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I. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN GRANTING
NEW UNION'S MOTION TO INTERVENE BY
RIGHT UNDER 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)?
Did the Court below err in granting New Union's motion to
intervene by right under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)? FSSC and Capi-
tol City appeal the court's decision; New Union supports it.
A. The Statutory Language.
"The starting point for interpreting a statute is the language
of the statute itself." Atwell v. KW Plastics Recycling Division, 173
F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1217 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (citing Consumer Prod.
Safety Communication v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)). The CWA provides that if the EPA Administrator is not a
party to a citizen suit action, the Administrator "may intervene as
a matter of right." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2)(2004). The "as a matter
of right" language used in the CWA originates in FED. R. Civ. P.
24(a)(1) which provides that "[u]pon timely application anyone
shall be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of
the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene."
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(1) The question is whether a state, here the
state of New Union, may intervene as a matter of right as if it
were the United States, under 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2). Neither
party provides substantial case law that answers this particular
question therefore it is apparently a case of first impression.
B. Statutory Interpretation.
The court must begin with the plain meaning of the statutory
language. If the statutory language is ambiguous, a court may
resort to legislative history to decipher the intention underlying
the language. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay
Found., 484 U.S. 49, 56 (1987); see also Miccosukee Tribe of Indi-
ans v. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1086 (11th
Cir. 2002) (holding that where there is unambiguous statutory
language, such language is the law intended by Congress); see also
United States v. LaBonte, 520 U.S. 751, 757 (1997) (stating that
when Congress drafts legislation it says what it means); United
States v. Gonzalas, 520 U.S. 1, 6 (1997) (holding that where statu-
tory language is clear, there is no need to resort to legislative his-
tory); Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337 (1997) (explaining
that if that statutory scheme is consistent and coherent than the
inquiry into the intent must stop at the statutory language).
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C. FSSC and Capitol City Argument: The Court Below
Erred in Granting New Union's Motion to Intervene
by Right Under the CWA.
1. Where the Statute is Clear the Court Must Apply the
Plain Meaning of the Statute.
The Court below stated that "iwihile the observation of the
original parties may be true as a matter of mere statutory word-
ing, courts may freely ignore the 'happenstance of statutory draft-
ing' when it does not reflect congressional intent." Problem Pg. 5;
citing N. and S. Rivers Watershed Ass'n. v. Town of Scituate, 949
F.2d 552, 555 (1st Cir. 1991). The court improperly allowed New
Union's intervention because (1) where a statute is unambiguous
its plain meaning must be applied, and (2) the court improperly
relies on the North and South Rivers case.
2. The Plain Meaning of the Statute Provides that the
Administrator, Not the State, May Intervene by Right
in Citizen Suits Brought Under the CWA.
A Capitol possesses a statutory right to intervene only when a
federal statute unambiguously grants the applicant an uncondi-
tional right to participate in the litigation. FED. R. CIv. PRO.
24(a). The statutory language of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(c)(2), based on
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, unambiguously grants the
Administrator a right to intervene, not the state entity. The plain
language and canons of statutory interpretation dictate that the
wording of the statute be followed. Because New Union is not the
Administrator of the EPA, but rather the state agency, it has no
authority to intervene, as-of-right, and therefore must be denied
intervention in this action.
3. The Court Improperly Applied the Holding of the North
and South Rivers Case to the Instant Facts.
In holding that New Union had a right to intervene in the
present action, the court improperly relied on North and South
Rivers. There the court held that the "happenstance of statutory
drafting" could be ignored in isolated instances. North and South
Rivers at 556. In North and South Rivers the court was trying to
reconcile a state law that lacked a penalty provision with a compa-
rable federal penalty provision. Id. Because state and federal
statutory schemes were similar and served the same goals,
namely the protection of state waterways, the court found that
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penalties could exist absent the specific statutory language. Id. at
556. The present case is distinguishable as it does not involve de-
termining whether a state statute is the equivalent of a federal
statute. Furthermore, the North and South Rivers decision comes
from the First Circuit, and should not outweigh the plain meaning
rule that has been repeatedly upheld by the Supreme Court. See
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians v. Everglades Restoration Alliance,
304 F.3d 1076, 1086 (11th Cir. 2002).
In North and South River, the court was persuaded that the
dominant policy of the CWA was state administration of the water
pollution program. 949 F.2d at 556 ; See also 33 U.S.C. § 1251.
While this is a strong Congressional policy preference, it is cer-
tainly not the dominant one, which is restoration of the quality of
our nation's waters. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251. To achieve that goal,
Congress harnessed the participation of both federal and state
players to undertake appropriate roles. It assigned EPA the role
of promulgating regulations of general applicability including
technology based standards to be met across the country; CWA
§§ 301(b) and 304; the standards governing EPA approval of state
permit programs; CWA §§ 304 and 402; the standards governing
EPA approval of state water quality standards, CWA § 304. More-
over, Congress charged EPA to inspect water pollution sources an-
ywhere, CWA § 308, to enforce against violation of EPA and state
issued permits, CWA § 309, and to issue permits where there is no
state with an EPA approved program. CWA § 402. Congress was
very clear in each section whether it was authorizing EPA or state
action. Thus, in an intricately interwoven web of federal and state
authority, particular attention should be paid to whether Con-
gress assigned authority to the federal or state government.
Where it assigned authority to the federal government, it should
be presumed it intended just that result.
4. New Union May Not Intervene Under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 24(a)(2), Permissive Intervention,
Because It Did Not Raise This Upon Intervention.
New Union argues that even if this Court does not find that it
may intervene as-of-right under the CWA, it can permissively in-
tervene at the court's discretion. New Union further contends
that even though it did not raise permissive intervention in its
motion to intervene, that it is harmless error and therefore the
court should allow it to remain in the litigation going forward.
Courts have discretionary power to grant permissive intervention
20051
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where the Capitol (1) shows independent ground for jurisdiction;
(2) the motion to intervene is timely; and (3) the applicant's claim
or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in
common. Greene v. Babbitt, 996 F.2d 973, 978 (1993) (citing Vene-
gas v. Skaggs, 867 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989)); see also E.E.O.C.
v. Nat'l Children's Center, Inc., 146 F.3d 1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1998).
New Union has failed to make a timely motion for interven-
tion, since it moves to intervene upon appeal, and therefore does
not meet the second prong of the three prong criteria that has
been established and applied by courts when granting permissive
intervention. Consequently, the Court must prevent New. Union
from remaining a party in the present litigation. New Union ar-
gues that because it would have been granted the right to permis-
sively intervene had it filed a timely motion for such intervention,
that to allow it to remain in the litigation now would be harmless
error. No case law supports this argument. The Court should ap-
ply the three prong permissive intervention test and remove New
Union from the case.
D. New Union Argument: The Court Below Properly
Granted New Union's Motion to Intervene By Right
Under the CWA
1. The Court Must Look To the Intentions of the
Legislature In Its Interpretation of the Statutory
Language.
A dominant purpose of the statute is to recognize states' pri-
mary role in carrying out the provisions and requirements of the
CWA. A narrow reading of the intervention provision ignores this
federalism policy in favor of the happenstance of the statutory
drafting. See N. and S. Rivers Watershed Assn. v. Town of Scitu-
ate, 949 F.2d. 552, 556 (1st Cir. 1992). In that case, the court de-
termined that although CWA § 309(g)(6) barred a citizen suit only
when a state had issued a penalty under state law "comparable" to
CWA § 309(g), Congress intended to bar citizen suits when a state
took any enforcement action and had comparable penalty author-
ity somewhere in its unused arsenal of enforcement sanctions. Id.
at 556.
CWA § 101 repeatedly recognizes the important and funda-
mental role of the states in water pollution control. This recogni-
tion is manifested through the authorization in CWA § 401 for
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states to certify state provisions in federal permits affecting water
and the direction in CWA § 402(b) that EPA approves qualified
state permit programs to operate in place of a federal water pollu-
tion permit program. For this reason, the rationale applied in
North and South Rivers can also be applied to the instant case.
There, because the court determined that although the statutory
language did not include a penalty provision, the state could inter-
pret a comparable federal provision for penalties because of the
similarity between the state and federal statutory schemes. North
and South Rivers, at 553. Here, because the CWA authorizes
broad state authority and interpretation of the CWA but fails to
explicitly provide a right of action to the State to intervene, the
Court should uphold the intervention.
Because Congress in the CWA treats states on par with the
United States, Congress intended the state be given intervention
rights equal to the United States. States can designate water bod-
ies, implement water quality standards, and implement state per-
mit schemes, yet they cannot intervene as-of-right under the
CWA. Congress did not intend to create an anomaly between the
state authority to implement water pollution control programs on
the one hand, and state inability to intervene in citizen suits to
enforce such authority.
2. Even if the Court Determines that New Union May Not
Intervene As-of-Right, the Court May Grant
Permissive Intervention Pursuant to Fed.R. Civ. P.
24(a)(2).
New Union intervenes on behalf of its aggrieved citizens, and
therefore may intervene as an interested party as-of-right. The
Supreme Court established the following four-part test to deter-
mine whether an applicant may intervene under Fed. R.Civ. P.
24(a)(2) as-of-right: (1) motion to intervene must be timely, (2) the
applicant must claim a significantly protectable interest relating
to the property or transaction that is the subject of the action, (3)
the applicant must be so situated that disposition of the action
may, as a practical matter, impair the interest, and (4) the appli-
cants interests must be inadequately represented in the action.
See Sierra Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1993).
If, however, the court here finds that New Union may not in-
tervene as-of-right, it should find that New Union may perma-
nently intervene under Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(2) permissive
intervention. The court has discretion to determine whether a
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party may permissively intervene in an action. See E.E.O.C. v.
Nat'l Children's Center, Inc., 146 F.3d.1042, 1046 (D.C. Cir.
1998)(stating that permissive intervention "is an inherently dis-
cretionary enterprise"). The general rule is that a court will per-
mit a non-party to intervene when a "non-party's claim or defense
and the main action have a 'question of law or fact in common.'
Duke Energy Field Servs. Assets, L.L.C., v. Fed. Energy Regulatory
Comm'n, 150 F. Supp. 2d 150,153 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Fed. R.
Civ. P. 24(6)). For a claim to go forward on the merits under
FRCP 24(b), the intervenor must show: "(1) an independent
ground for subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a timely motion; and (3)
a claim or defense that has question of law or fact in common with
the main action." E.E.O.C, at 1046; see also Greene v. Babbitt,
996 F.2d 973, 978 (9th Cir. 1993) (citing Venegas v. Skaggs, 867
F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1989)).
Presently, the state of New Union meets all three of these cri-
teria. Its independent ground for subject matter jurisdiction is
that its citizens, on whose behalf it sues, have been injured under
a federal statute. It moved for intervention at the proper time, and
it joins parties to the litigation because both its claims and de-
fenses are directly related to the diversion of water from the Rapid
River. FSSC argues that because it did not raise permissive inter-
vention in its motion to intervene, it fails to meet the criteria and
therefore cannot go forward. However, had New Union raised per-
missive intervention upon its motion to intervene, the court could
have properly granted the intervention within its discretion.
Therefore, allowing it to remain in the litigation now is harmless
to the proceedings and therefore New Union should be a party to
the litigation moving forward.
II. MUST THE COURT RAISE THE STANDING
ISSUE SUA SPONTE?
Since the defendants' did not raise the question of standing at
the District Court level, and it is a jurisdictional question, the
Court must now consider whether FSSC has standing. The issue
is whether the Court must raise jurisdictional questions sua
sponte, particularly the question of standing in the present case.
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A. The Court of Appeals Must Raise Any Jurisdictional
Issue Sua Sponte Even Where Neither the Lower
Court Nor the Parties Have Raised the Issue.
Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, they
may only hear cases that they have been authorized to hear by the
Constitution or Congress. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.
of America, 511 U.S. 375 (1994). Therefore, the Court may assess
whether there is subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, even
where the parties have not raised the issue. Rembert v. Apfel, 213
F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2000). Jurisdictional issues may be
raised at any time, regardless of whether they were raised in the
lower court. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't. the Court
held that jurisdictional issues "would have to be considered by this
Court even though not raised earlier in the litigation - indeed,
this Court would have to raise them sua sponte." 523 U.S. 83, 93
(1998). Where a question exists concerning the jurisdiction of the
federal court, the court must raise the jurisdictional question sua
sponte. See Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Ed. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 278
(1977) (holding that the Supreme Court is obliged to raise sua
sponte issues surrounding the jurisdiction of the court); see also
Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 740 (1976) (find-
ing that where neither party questioned the jurisdiction of the
court, the court was obligated to do so on its own motion); see also
Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 453
(1900).
1. Standing is Jurisdictional and Therefore the Court Must
Raise it Sua Sponte.
Standing is a jurisdictional requirement, and failure to raise
the issue in the district court does not prevent a party from rais-
ing the issue on an appeal. Granite State Outdoor Advertising,
Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112, 1116 n.3 (11th Cir.
2003). Furthermore, because "federal courts are under an inde-
pendent obligation to examine their own jurisdiction, and stand-
ing is perhaps the most important of the jurisdictional doctrines"
the instant court must raise the standing issue sua sponte. United
States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 742 (1995), citing FW/PBS, Inc. v.
Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 230 (1990); see also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S.
343, 349 (1996) (holding that standing is jurisdictional and hence,
not subject to waiver). The parties here have failed to raise the
required jurisdictional question of standing. Because standing is
jurisdictional, and federal courts of limited jurisdiction must raise
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jurisdictional questions, the Court here is required to address this
issue.
B. Standing Requirements.
An organization has standing to bring a law suit on behalf of
its members if it can establish that "its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right, the interests at stake are
germane to the organization's purpose, and neither the claim as-
serted nor the relief requested requires the participation of indi-
vidual members in the lawsuit." Friends of the Earth, Inc., v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000). Further-
more, to establish standing an individual must show three ele-
ments which include 1) that the person must have suffered an
"injury-in-fact" that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) ac-
tual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; 2) that the in-
jury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant;
and 3) that it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id. at 180; see
also Parker v. Scrap Metal Processors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1003
(11th Cir. 2004) (citing Wolff v. Cash 4 Titles, 351 F. 3d 1348, 1353
(11th Cir. 2003).
Presently, the affidavits submitted by both Nelson Spinner
and Newton Creel raise the question of standing. The question
here is whether the two named individuals have suffered an in-
jury, as they do not consume the fish that they catch. Further-
more, they can still fish for Cutthroat Trout but in order to do so
have to travel further to take advantage of the fishing as a recrea-
tional endeavor. They can travel to other areas on the Rapid
River and they can travel to other rivers to fish.
III. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN GRANTING
CAPITOL CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE
COURT LACKED JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE BECAUSE FSSC'S MEMBERS,
NELSON SPINNER AND NEWTON CREEL,
FAILED TO GIVE PROPER NOTICE OF THEIR
INTENT TO SUE UNDER 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A)?
Did the court below err in granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment because the court lacked jurisdiction over the
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case when FSSC's members, Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel,
failed to give proper prior notice of their intent to sue under 33
U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)?
A The Statute and Regulations.
The citizen suit provision of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)
grants the citizens the authority to initiate a civil action "against
any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of ... an effluent
standard or limitation" under the Act. To exercise this right a citi-
zen must provide the relevant parties with timely notice:
No action may be commenced ... under subsection (a)(1) of this
section... prior to sixty days after the plaintiff has given notice
of the alleged violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State
in which the alleged violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged vio-
lator of the standard, limitation, or order....
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A).
The CWA bars citizen suits where the EPA or the applicable
State authority has already "commenced, and is diligently prose-
cuting," an enforcement action. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B).
The EPA Administrator may "prescribe by regulation" the
manner in which notice must be given, including the proper con-
tent of the notice. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). EPA has promulgated reg-
ulations that require that appropriate citizen suit notice
shall include sufficient information to permit the recipient to
identify the specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to
have been violated, the activity alleged to constitute a violation,
the person or persons responsible for the alleged violation, the
location of the alleged violation, the date or dates of such viola-
tion, and the full name, address, and telephone number of the
person giving notice.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2004).
B. The Purpose and Legislative Intent of Citizen Suit
Notice Provisions.
Courts have suggested different purposes behind the notice
requirement. The two most commonly cited purposes for provision
of proper notice of commencement of a citizen suit are: 1) to allow
the alleged violator to come into compliance and thereby avoiding
the need for a citizen suit, and 2) to allow EPA to pursue an en-
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forcement action, thereby obviating the need for a citizen suit. See
generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc.,
538 U.S. 167 (2003); Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
(1989); Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc., 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
1. Opportunity for Alleged Violators to Comply with the
CWA.
In Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found.,
Inc. the Supreme Court suggested that the purpose of giving "no-
tice to the alleged violator is to give it an opportunity to bring it-
self into complete compliance with the Act and thus likewise
render unnecessary a citizen suit." 484 U.S. at 60; see also
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. Inc., 528 U.S. at
175, (citing Gwaltney and holding that notice gives an alleged vio-
lator of the CWA an opportunity to come into compliance with the
CWA, rendering a citizen suit unnecessary). In Hallstrom v. Til-
lamook County, the Supreme Court further clarified citizen suit
notice provisions stating that the congressional purpose for the
notice provision is to give "agencies and alleged violators [to bene-
fit from] a nonadversarial period to achieve compliance with [envi-
ronmental] regulations" 493 U.S. at 32; see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 6972(a).
2. Primacy of Government Enforcement.
Citizen suits supplement, rather than supplant government
action in enforcing statutory and regulatory requirements.
Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. The Court in Gwaltney arrived at this
conclusion by interpreting the CWA's statutory language and leg-
islative history. Specifically, the Court infers that "[tihe bar on
citizen suits when governmental enforcement action is underway
suggests that citizen suits are meant to supplement, rather than
supplant governmental action." Id. at 60. In Hallstrom the Court
reiterated this inference by upholding the District Court's deter-
mination that "the purpose of the notice requirement was to give
administrative agencies an opportunity to enforce environmental
regulations." 493 U.S. at 24. Since the purpose of the citizen suit
is to supplement governmental enforcement action, the notice re-
quirement serves to inform the government that a violation may
have occurred and government enforcement may be necessary.
The Administrator then has the discretion either to pursue an en-
forcement action, or allow the citizen suit to proceed.
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The legislative history of the CWA provides support for the
Court's interpretation of the citizen suit notice requirements. In
Gwaltney, the Court explicitly relied on this legislative history.
484 U.S. at 61. The Senate Report of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, states that citizen suits are proper
when "the Federal, State, and local agencies fail to exercise their
enforcement responsibility." S. Rep. No. 92-414, at 64 (1971), re-
printed in 2 A Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act of 1972, at 1482 (1973). However, "the great volume of en-
forcement actions" should "be brought by the State." Id. Surely, if
Congress simultaneously intended that citizen suits supplement,
not supplant, government enforcement and mandated an EPA-
fashioned notice requirement, it expected that the resulting notice
requirement would contain the requisite information necessary to
enable EPA to preclude a citizen suit and take direct enforcement
action. In addition, during the legislative hearings prior to enact-
ment of the law, members of Congress repeatedly referred to the
citizen suit provision as an "abatement mechanism." See, e.g.,
Water Pollution Control Legislation, Hearings Before the Subcom-
mittee on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Committee on
Public Works, 92d Cong., at 114 (1971). Thus, Congress intended
citizen suits to be an environmental protection tool by either al-
lowing individuals to bring suit against alleged polluters, or spur-
ring "diligent prosecution" by EPA or the appropriate State
authority.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Citizen Suit Notice
Provisions.
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989), is the
leading case interpreting the citizen suit notice requirement. In
Hallstrom, the Supreme Court held that compliance with the
sixty-day notice provisions of the Resource Conservation and Re-
covery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992(k), was a mandatory
condition precedent to bringing a citizen suit. 493 U.S. 20. There,
plaintiffs alleged that the County was in violation of RCRA and
failed to give notice of their intention to sue to the government
enforcement agencies. Id. Because the plaintiffs only notified Til-
lamook County and not the Oregon Department of Environmental
Quality (ODEQ) or the Environmental Protection Agency, the
Court found the plaintiffs failed to comply with the applicable no-
tice requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(1). Id. The Supreme Court
held that the "notice and 60-day delay requirements" were
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"mandatory conditions precedent to commencing suit under RCRA
citizen suit provision." Id. at 31. The Court intentionally avoided
a determination regarding the jurisdictional nature of notice, stat-
ing "[iin light of our literal interpretation of the statutory require-
ment, we need not determine whether [the notice provision] is
jurisdictional in the strict sense of the term." Id. The Hallstrom
holding has been applied to cases involving citizen suit notice pro-
visions of other environmental statutes, including the CWA. See,
e.g., Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d
1239, 1246 (3d Cir. 1995) (applying Hallstrom's interpretation of
RCRA to the CWA); see also Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F.
Supp. 1113, 1118 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (applying strictly the terms of
the CWA notice provision in accordance with Hallstrom v. Til-
lamook County). The Court itself suggests this analogy by stating
that the same requirements are in place in the citizen suit provi-
sions of other statutes. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 23.
1. Liberal and Strict Construction.
Despite the Supreme Court's strict construction of the citizen
suit notice requirements, some courts strictly construe the re-
quirements and other courts liberally construe them. Because the
Supreme Court in Halistrom did not hold that notice was a juris-
dictional requirement, some courts have used that refusal to ar-
gue against strict construction. Where courts have refused strict
construction of the notice requirement, they have done so on an ad
hoc basis depending on the facts of the case.
Identification of Proper Parties to a Citizen Suit Notice of
Intent to Sue.
Did FSSC provide adequate notice even though it did not in-
clude the names and address of its member plaintiffs when it
served notice on the defendants?
D. Relevant Regulatory Language.
The question before this Court is one of first impression. The
Court must determine whether the failure of FSSC to include the
names and addresses of the members whose interests it is repre-
senting renders the notice fatally flawed. Specifically, the regula-
tions promulgated pursuant to the notice requirement of 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(b)(1)(A) require that the notice include the "full name, ad-
dress, and telephone number of the person giving notice." 40
C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (2004).
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E. FSSCINU Argument: The Court Below Erred in
Granting Capitol City Summary Judgment Because
it Lacked Jurisdiction to Consider the Case.
1. FSSC Did Not Violate the Naming Requirement of the
Notice Regulation by Omitting the Names of Nelson
Spinner and Newton Creel From its Notice of Intent
to Sue.
This is a case of first impression. Contrary to defendant's as-
sertions, Nelson Spinner and Newton Creel are not new parties to
this lawsuit, but rather, are members of the plaintiff organization
which is suing Capitol City on behalf of all of its non-named mem-
bers. Where an organization sues on behalf of the non-named in-
dividuals, the organization, not its members, is the plaintiff. See
generally Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528
U.S. 167.
A membership association has standing to sue on behalf of its
members when (1) those members would have standing to bring
the same suit on their own behalf, (2) the interests the association
seeks to protect are germane to the association's purpose, and (3)
neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested requires the
participation of individual members in the lawsuit. Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000);
N.Y. State Club Ass'n. v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
FSSC must establish its standing to bring this suit against Capi-
tol City and can achieve such standing by showing injury to one or
more of its members. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735
(1972). However, the defendants have not raised the question of
FSSC's standing. Rather, defendants allege that FSSC improp-
erly served notice by failing to include the names of Nelson Spin-
ner and Newton Creel in their notice. [EXHIBIT A]. Because
FSSC properly brings suit on behalf of its members and is the ap-
propriate plaintiff in the instant action, FSSC has properly named
itself and not its members in the notice.
Defendants erroneously rely upon Washington Trout in their
response to FSSC's complaint. In Washington Trout, the District
Court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide the alleged viola-
tors with sufficient notice to enable them to initiate settlement
negotiations. Washington Trout v. Scab Rock Feeders, 823 F.
Supp. 819 (E.D. Wash.1993). Plaintiffs' defective notice of intent
to sue also precluded the government from initiating an enforce-
ment action against the alleged violators. Id. at 820. These facts
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are not analogous to the instant case since neither outcome is pre-
sent in the current case. Instead, the content of FSSC's notice to
Capitol City provides sufficient specificity to allow either the de-
fendant or the relevant enforcement agency to take action to ad-
dress the allegations in the notice. Capitol City's reliance on
Washington Trout is also dubious because in that case the court
held that the sole purpose behind the citizen suit notice provisions
is to provide for the opportunity for settlement negotiations be-
tween plaintiff and defendant. Id. This holding contravenes the
legislative intent of the CWA, the Supreme Court's finding in
Hallstrom, and subsequent interpretation of the statute and regu-
lations by the lower courts. See, e.g., Water Pollution Control Leg-
islation, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Air and Water
Pollution of the Senate Committee on Public Works, 92d Cong., at
114 (1971); see also Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20
(1989); Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50
F.3d 1239 (3d Cir. 1995); Bettis v. Town of Ontario., 800 F. Supp.
1113 (W.D.N.Y. 1992).
F. Capitol City Argument: The Notice Submitted by FSSC
is Fatally Flawed Because it Did Not Include the
Full Name, Address, and Telephone Number of the
Plaintiffs Nelson Spinner and Newtown Creel in
the Manner Prescribed by the Administrator.
1. The Statutory Language Must be Strictly Construed to
Require that FSSC Name Each Individual Plaintiff in
its Notice of Intent to Sue.
Naming of each individual bringing a lawsuit is a mandatory
precondition for the suit. Wash. Trout v. Scab Rock Feeders, 823
F. Supp. 819 (E.D. Wash.1993). In Washington Trout, the plain-
tiffs timely served notice on the alleged violators, but failed to pro-
vide any of the names of the plaintiffs bringing the action. 823 F.
Supp. at 822. The court strictly read the language of the statute
and dismissed the plaintiffs' claims. In its holding, the Washing-
ton Trout court reasoned that 1) plaintiffs had failed to follow the
plain language of the notice requirements and 2) that such failure
contravened the purpose underlying the notice provision, i.e., to
provide the alleged violators with information required for them
to pursue negotiations. Id. Similarly, FSSC has directly violated
the naming requirement of the notice regulations by failing to in-
clude the names of the injured parties, Nelson Spinner and
Newton Creel, in its notice of intent to sue.
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Post-Notice Violations.
G. Relevant Regulatory Language and Legislative
History.
EPA's regulations require that "[niotice.. .shall include suffi-
cient information to permit the recipient to identify the specific
standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been violated.. ." 40
C.F.R. § 135.3(a) (Emphasis added).
Legislative history from the 92nd Congress, which enacted
the citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. §1365, provides the most pro-
bative evidence of what was intended by legislation. Some courts
have also sought to interpret the legislation from the legislative
history of the 99th Congress, in 1987, when the CWA was
amended.
H. Relevant Case Law Concerning Post-Notice and
Continuing Violations.
The question before the court here is whether violations that
occurred subsequent to service of notice may be included in the
complaint or these proceedings. A number of courts have con-
fronted the issue of whether violations need to be continuous upon
date of service of notice and the date that the complaint is filed. It
should be noted that here, the question centers around the viola-
tions that occurred following the notice and whether the failure to
include such violations, renders the notice inadequate or flawed.
The issue of whether the plaintiffs must allege ongoing violations
in order to establish standing has not been raised, however, the
court may raise the question because standing is jurisdictional.
Courts have determined that the notice provision requires
that citizens allege ongoing violations as opposed to wholly past
violations in their complaint. See generally, Gwaltney of Smith-
field, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S at 49. See also
Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
175 (2000)(holding that citizens lack standing under CWA for "vio-
lations that have ceased by the time the complaint is filed"). The
reasoning in these cases is the congressional intent underlying the
citizen suit and notice provisions that the notice provision allows
the alleged violator to bring itself into compliance with the Act or
the government to carry out its enforcement role. Id. Hence, if
violations have occurred wholly in the past, and are not ongoing
and continuing, the purposes of the provisions have been met and
20051 403
33
PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
the suit is no longer needed to achieve compliance. See Gwaltney,
484 U.S. at 59 (noting that if "citizen suits may target wholly past
violations, the requirement of notice to the alleged violator be-
comes gratuitous"). This rationale is further supported by the no-
tice provision which provides that citizens suits will be barred
when the Administrator has commenced an action "to require
compliance." Id. at 59 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(B); CWA
§ 505(b)(1)(B)). The Court asserts that the statutory language di-
rects that citizen suits are not merely actions for penalties for past
violations, but are compliance based and seek to prevent further
harm. Id.
The Court in Gwaltney held that even where notice provisions
fulfill the statutory content requirements, a second prerequisite
for citizen suits is that the alleged violations are continflous or
intermittent and that the violator is therefore presently "in viola-
tion" of the standard. 484 U.S. at 57. The Court found that there
must be a "reasonable likelihood that a past polluter will continue
to violate in the future." Id. On remand to the Fourth Circuit, the
Gwaltney court established two ways in which ongoing violations
could be established by the plaintiff which include either, (1) prov-
ing violations on or after the date that the complaint is filed, or (2)
by adducing evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could
find a likelihood of a recurrence in intermittent or sporadic viola-
tions. 890 F.2d 690, 693 (4th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the
Gwaltney court noted on remand that sporadic violations "do not
cease until the date when there is no real likelihood of repetition.
Id. at 693. In its interpretation of the Gwaltney holding, the Su-
preme Court recognized that the present tense language in the
CWA bars suits for wholly past violations and that such suits
would render the citizen suit notice requirements meaningless.
Citizens for a Better Environment v. Steel Co., 90 F.3d 1237, 1242
(7th Cir. 1996). Gwaltney and Citizens for a Better Environment
addressed the notice issue, as well as the standing issue, but the
court in the present action needs focus primarily on the notice
issue.
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L FSSC and New Union Arguments: The Statute and
Regulations Do Not Require That FSSC Allege On-
Going Violations In Order to Serve Proper Notice
on Capitol City.
1. The Regulations Only Require Notice of Past Violations.
The regulations provide that proper notice "include[s]... the
specific standard, limitation, or order alleged to have been vio-
lated. . .." (Emphasis added.) The regulation's use of the past
tense, i.e., that a prohibition has "been violated," makes it clear
that FSSC need not allege Capitol City's on-going violation in or-
der to serve proper notice. This reading of the rule is supported by
the regulations' requirement of the dates of such past violations.
40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a)(2004). Thus, the regulations do not require
FSSC to allege that Capitol City's violations are on-going and, as a
result, FSSC's notice to Capitol City is proper.
2. The Purpose of the Citizen Suit Notice Requirement
Would Not Be Served By Requiring FSSC to Allege
That Capitol City's Violations Would Be On-Going
Sixty Days Prior to Issuing Such Notice.
As describe above, one of the purposes behind the notice re-
quirement is to obviate the need for a citizen suit by allowing the
alleged violator to bring itself into compliance with the relevant
standards, limitations, or guidelines, presumably by ceasing to
discharge. See, e.g., Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 60. See also Friends of
the Earth, 528 U.S. at 175; Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 24. It would not
only be pragmatically impossible for a notice to accurately allege
that violations will occur sixty days in the future, but to do so runs
counter to the purpose behind the notice requirement. If the no-
tice requirement serves its purpose, the notice recipient will cease
its ongoing violations by the time the 60 day period has tolled,
obviating the need for a complaint.
J. Capitol City Argument: FSSC Failed to Give Proper
Notice Because It Does Not Allege Continuing
Violations In Its Notice of Intent to Sue.
1. FSSC Must Allege Post-Notice Violations In Order to
Bring Suit.
Failing to allege ongoing violations that will occur post-notice
renders the notice fatally flawed and therefore defeats jurisdic-
tion. The language of the notice states, "Capitol City has violated
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§ 1311(a) each and everyday from August 15, 2003 until the date
of this notice.. ." Exhibit A, p 11. In Gwaltney, supra, the court
held that because the EPA or state that issued the permit could
begin suit sixty-days subsequent to receiving notice, citizens could
only seek civil penalties for a suit brought to abate ongoing viola-
tions. As with the requirement to allege ongoing violations upon
filing of the complaint, the same rationale applies to the notice
requirement. If the violations do not continue at the time the no-
tice is served, presumably such violations have ceased rendering
the notice and subsequent remedial actions, enforcement actions,
or citizen suit unnecessary.
2. The Purpose of the Citizen Suit Notice Provision is Not
Fulfilled Through FSSC's Notice.
The judicial precedent and congressional intent behind the
notice provision has been repeatedly referenced as including 1) the
opportunity for the alleged violator to come into compliance with
the requisite standard or limitation, and 2) to provide the govern-
ment the opportunity to pursue an enforcement action thereby al-
leviating the need for the citizen suit to continue. Gwaltney of
SmithfieldLtd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, 484 U.S. 49, 60.
By failing to allege continued violations in the notice, it remains
unclear that the violations persist and that therefore, government
enforcement or compliance is needed. The court must dismiss
FSSC's citizen suit.
Proper Definition of the Regulated Pollutant.
K Defining "Settle-able Solid," "Silt," and 'Turbidity."
The EPA has included within its definition of "conventional
pollutants" suspended solids. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a). This defi-
nition includes "settle-able solids," "silt," and "turbidity." The
term "silt" is often used interchangeably with the terms "mud"
and "muddy," both of which connote the presence of "settle-able
solid[s]." See, e.g., The American Heritage Dictionary of the En-
glish Language 1621 ( 4th ed.1996). Furthermore, the word
turbid is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the En-
glish Language to mean "having sediment or foreign particles
stirred up or suspended; muddy," and turbidity is further defined
to mean "muddiness created by stirring up sediment or having for-
eign particles suspended." Id. at 1856.
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According to guidance documents issued by EPA Office of
Water, turbidity involves water that contains suspended solids.
See http://www.epa.gov/owowwtrl/monitoring/volunteer/stream/
vms55.html (last viewed October 20, 2004). EPA goes on to state
that "[sluspended material include[s] soil particles (clay, silt,
sand)." Id. Further, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Fisheries
Handbook defines "silt loads" as synonymous with "settle-able
solids."M.C. Bell, U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Fisheries Handbook
of Engineering Requirements and Biological Criteria, (1986). Fi-
nally, in its guidance for water quality standards, EPA explains
that "It]otal solids are dissolved solids plus settle-able
solids... Suspended solids include silt and clay particles... and
other particulate matter." See EPA Office of Water, Monitoring
Water Quality, Volunteer Stream Monitoring, A Methods Manual,
available at http://www.epa.gov/volunteer/stream/stream.pdf (last
viewed September 24, 2004). As a result, FSSC's use of the term
"silt-laden water" in its citizen suit notice of intent to sue Capitol
City sufficiently used the term "silt-laden water" to identify the
pollutants in contention as regulated "settle-able solids."
1. Sufficient Information.
Proper citizen suit notice need not identify all details of an
alleged violation, but sufficient information that allows the al-
leged violator to identify the elements of the alleged violation. See
Public Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239
(3d Cir. 1995). See also San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v. Tosco,
309 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2002). See also ONRC Action v. Columbia
Plywood, Inc., 286 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that
notice need only be sufficiently specific to inform an alleged viola-
tor of its wrong and how it could avert an impending law suit or
enforcement action); NRDC v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d
985, 996 (9th Cir. 2000)(citing Atlantic States Legal Found. v.
Stroh Die Casting Co. 116 F.3d 814 (7th Cir. 1997) holding that
notice must be sufficiently specific).
The Court in Hallstrom did not address the nature or extent
of the information required in a notice. 493 U.S. at 24. Rather,
the Court's holding applied only to the fact that plaintiffs in that
case had failed to serve any notice on the requisite Federal and
State enforcement authorities. Id. The plaintiffs' notice failed be-
cause it ignored the regulatory requirement that notice be served
not only to the alleged violator, but also to the Administrator and
to the State in which the alleged violation occurs. Hallstrom, 493
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U.S. at 27 (citing the requirements of 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)(i)-
(iii)). Further, the failure to provide notice to the government con-
travenes entirely the purpose of the notice provision which is to
allow the government to initiate an enforcement action thereby
alleviating any need for the citizen suit to go forward. Gwaltney,
484 U.S. 49
L. FSSC and New Union Arguments: Proper Notice was
Served Because FSSC Adequately Described the
Pollutants in Question.
1. "Silt-Laden Water" Adequately Describes "Settle-able
Solids," Which Are Included in EPA's Regulations.
Capitol City argues that FSSC's use of the term "silt-laden
waters" as the subject pollutant in its notice to sue does not ade-
quately identify the "specific standard, [or] limitation" violated as
required by the regulations. However, based on the guidance doc-
uments of EPA and the U.S. Army Corps, FSSC's use of the term
"silt-laden waters" is acceptably interchangeable with "suspended
solids" or "settle-able solids." Guidance documents from the EPA
and U.S. Army Corps further specify that suspended and settle-
able solids will have constituent parts that include silt, clay, sand
and other particles that remain in the water column for some pe-
riod of time before settling out. In accordance with these defini-
tions, FSSC's notice of intent to sue was appropriately specific in
identifying "silt-laden waters" as the regulated pollutant in con-
tention. FSSC's use of the term "silt-laden waters" is more de-
scriptive than either "suspended solid" or "settle-able solid" and
provides adequate notice of the pollutant in contention. Further,
"silt" is used interchangeably with terms contained in the gui-
dance documents of EPA and the U.S. Army Corps. Consequently,
FSSC's identification of "silt-laden water" in the notice provided
Capitol City with effective notice of the regulated pollutants in
contention.
Also, Courts have allowed citizens suits under the CWA to
proceed even where the violations identified in the notice were not
specific; the requirement is that the notice be sufficiently specific
to inform the alleged violator of its wrong-doing. See Atlantic
States Legal Found. v. Stroh Die Casting Co., 116 F.3d 814, 819
(7th Cir. 1997). See also, ONRC Action v. Columbia Plywood, Inc.,
286 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that notice need only
be sufficiently specific enough to inform an alleged violator of its
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wrong and how it could avert an impending law suit or enforce-
ment action); NRDC v. Southwest Marine, Inc., 236 F.3d 985, 996
(9th Cir. 2000)(citing Atlantic States holding that notice must be
sufficiently specific).
2. FSSC's Notice Provided Sufficient Information to
Capitol City and Fulfilled the Purpose of the Notice
Requirement.
Unlike the plaintiffs in Hallstrom, who did not give notice of
their citizen suit to the relevant Federal and State enforcement
authorities, FSSC merely used the term "silt-laden waters" inter-
changeably with "settle-able solid" to characterize the regulated
pollutant in its notice. Hallstrom, 493 U.S. at 25. As noted above,
the Hallstrom did not address the issue of sufficiency of the con-
tent of the notice, but rather dealt with a situation wherein the
plaintiffs completely failed to notify two of the three required no-
tice recipients, namely the State and EPA Administrator. 493
U.S. at 26-27. This failure, unlike the harmless error in the pre-
sent notice, contravenes the purpose underlying the notice re-
quirement, to provide the government with warning of an
impending citizen suit and thereby allowing it to bring an enforce-
ment action.
Further, contrary to Capitol City's contention, proper notice
need only be "sufficiently specific to inform the alleged violator
about what it is doing wrong, so that it knows what corrective ac-
tions will avert a lawsuit." Atlantic States Legal Found. v. Stroh
Die Casting Co., at 819; see also San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc., v.
Tosco, 309 F. 3d 1153, 1158 (9th Cir. 2002)(holding that the notice
is sufficient if it specifies enough detail to give the accused an op-
portunity to remedy the problem). Furthermore, the regulations
do not require that plaintiffs "list every specific aspect or detail of
every alleged violation." San Francisco, 309 F.3d at 1158 (quoting
Public Interest Research Group v. Hercules, Inc., 50 F.3d 1239,
1248 (3d Cir. 1995)). The error complained of by defendants, Capi-
tol City, does not defeat the purpose of the notice requirement.
Rather, FSSC's use of the term "silt-laden water" provided Capitol
City with sufficient information regarding the regulated pollutant
in contention and fulfilled the requirements of the citizen suit
notice.
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M. Capitol City Arguments: The Term "Silt-Laden
Waters" Does Not Adequately Describe the
Regulated Pollutant in Contention.
The Court in Washington Trout v. Scab Rock Feeders un-
equivocally established that a notice failing to contain the infor-
mation required by EPA's regulations must be dismissed. 45 F.3d
1351 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Bettis v. Town of Ontario, 800 F.
Supp 1113 (W.D.N.Y 1992). Relying, in part, on Hallstrom the
Washington Trout court dismissed a suit where two of the plain-
tiffs actually bringing suit were named in the notice. Wash. Trout
v. Scab Rock Feeders, 45 F.3d at 1354. Because the CWA notice
requirements state that "full name, address, and telephone num-
ber of the person giving notice" must be included, the Court fol-
lowed Hallstrom dismissing the case finding that proper notice
had not been served. Id. at 1353 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 135.3(a)
(1994).
Importantly, in the present case, as in Washington Trout, not
only are the technicalities of the notice provision violated, but the
omissions undercut the purpose that underlies the requirement.
Frequently cited language from Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v.
Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., has been repeatedly relied on,
that the purpose of the notice requirement is to allow the govern-
ment to pursue its own enforcement action or for the violators to
negotiate with the notifying parties seeking a resolution before a
citizen suit is filed. 484 U.S. 49, 59- 60. In Washington Trout the
parties were not named and therefore the defendants were not in
a position to negotiate. 45 F.3d at 1354. Similarly, in the instant
case, the failure to identify settle-able solids, not only expressly
violates the regulations, but also fails tell the defendant the viola-
tions it must remedy to avoid suit. And lastly, the failure to spec-
ify the violations as defined by the regulations also disenables the
government from bringing an enforcement action, as it is unclear
what such enforcement action would seek to enforce.
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IV. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN GRANTING
CAPITOL CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THAT CAPITOL CITY'S
DIVERSION OF SILT-LADEN WATERS OF
THE TORPID RIVER TO THE PRISTING RAPID
RIVER WITHOUT A PERMIT ISSUED UNDER 33
U.S.C. § 1311(a)?
A. Did The Court Below Properly Determine that the
Defendant, Capitol City, Did Not Violate 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) Because it Does Not Discharge Into
Navigable Waters?
1. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Language.
Subsection 301(a) of the CWA makes it illegal to discharge
pollutants to navigable waters without a permit or in violation of a
permit. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (hereafter NPDES) program mandates that
any person to discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit
has acted unlawfully and will be subject to penalties. Id. The
"discharge of a pollutant" means "any addition of any pollutant to
navigable waters from any point source. . ." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12).
To establish a violation of 33 U.S.C. § 1311 and the prohibition
against the discharge of pollutants, plaintiffs must show that de-
fendants have 1) discharged, 2) pollutants, 3) from a point source,
4) into navigable waters without a permit in violation of permit
conditions. Mich. v. Allen Park, 501 F. Supp. 1007, 1014 (E.D.
Mich. 1980), affd without op 667 F.2d 1028 (6th Cir. 1981).
"Addition" is not defined by the legislature but "pollutant,"
"navigable waters," and "point source" are defined within the stat-
ute and have been interpreted by the courts. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6),
(7), (12) and (14).
The Act defines "navigable waters" to mean "the waters of the
United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7).
EPA further defines "waters of the United States" in its regula-
tions to include "[All waters which are currently used, were used
in the past, or may be susceptible to use in inter-
state. . .commerce. . . [W]aters such as intrastate lakes, rivers,
streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds. .. "
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2003).
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Point source is defined as "any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch,
channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling
stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other
floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged."
33 U.S.C. § 1362(14); 40 C.F.R. § 401.11(d) (2003).
2. Purpose and Legislative Intent.
The purpose that underlies the NPDES program is the abate-
ment of pollution discharges from pollution sources with the aim
of overall improvement of water quality within the receiving body
of water. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Section 101 of the CWA states the
Congressional Declaration of Goals and Policy as follows:
"The objective of this chapter is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's wa-
ters; and to achieve the objective ... it is the national goal that
wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and
wildlife and provides for creation in and on the water body. .. "
33 U.S.C. § 125 1(a); see generally PUD No.1 v. Wash. Department
of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
Of further relevance is the Congressional intent that "naviga-
ble waters" be broadly construed in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). Histori-
cally, Congress used the term "navigable waters" to mean waters
that were "navigable in fact" or could be rendered navigable, exer-
cising its power over interstate commerce to improve water high-
ways of interstate commerce, under U.S. Const. Art. I. sec. 8, cl. 3.
Compare, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) with Kalur v.
Resur, 335 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1971). By defining "navigable wa-
ters" to mean "the waters of the United States, including territo-
rial seas," Congress meant to invoke federal jurisdiction over
United States waters to the broadest possible extent allowable
under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution. Leslie Salt
Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F. 2d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 1978); (citing Cal. ex
rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963 (9th
Cir.1975)); see also EPA v. State Water Resources Control Board,
426 U.S. 200 (1976); see also NRDC v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685,
(D. Colo. 1975); see also Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc., v. Al-
exander, 511 F. Supp. 278, 286 (W.D. La. 1981). Courts have de-
termined in light of precedent and legislative history that the
Congressional intent to extend the CWA's jurisdiction to the con-
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stitutional limit includes tributaries of rivers which, "when com-
bined with other waters or systems of transportation . . . the
commerce on such waters would have a substantial economic ef-
fect on interstate commerce." Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control
Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963, 964 (9th Cir. 1975) citing Report of the
Conference Committee on S. 2770, reported in A Legislative His-
tory of the Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 166,
178 (Comm. on Publ. Works Print, 1973) [hereinafter cited as Leg-
islative History].
B. Supreme Court Precedent.
1. Degree of Agency Discretion Afforded.
When reviewing an agency's interpretation of statutes it in-
terprets, courts give its interpretation a high standard of defer-
ence, as articulated by the Court in Chevron. Chevron v. NRDC,
467 U.S. 837 (1984). There the Supreme Court stated that courts
"[had] long recognized that considerable weight should be ac-
corded to an executive department's construction of a statutory
scheme it is entrusted to administer. . . ." Id. at 844. However, in
United States v. Mead, Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), the Court lim-
ited the Chevron deference test. Mead held that administrative
interpretation of statutory provisions qualify for Chevron defer-
ence "when it appears that Congress delegated authority to the
agency... to make rules carrying the force of law" and that the
deferred to interpretation "was promulgated in the exercise of that
authority." Id. at 226. The Supreme Court has also held that
"Ii]nterpretations such as those in opinion letters.., do not war-
rant Chevron-style deference." Christensen v. Harris County, 529
U.S. 576, 587 (2000). The Court there determined that agency in-
terpretations and opinions that are expressed through opinion let-
ters or other communications not codified in law or expressed in
formal rule-makings "are 'entitled to respect,' but only to the ex-
tent that those interpretations have the power to persuade." Id.
at 587 (citing Skidmore v. Swift and Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
2. Diversion Supreme Court Precedent.
The Supreme Court has not expressly determined whether a
transfer between two water bodies requires an NPDES permit. In
Miccosukee, it remanded for the district court to determine
whether a canal from which water was pumped and the reservoir
into which it was pumped were "meaningfully distinct" water bod-
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ies. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541
U.S. 95, 112 (2004). If they were not, then no NPDES permit
would be required. Id. In remanding on this factual question, the
Supreme Court left open the question pertaining to the "unitary
waters" theory, advanced by the government in that case, see id.,
and advanced by Capitol City and New Union in the instant case.
Navigable Waters
Does the Rapid River Constitute "navigable waters" under the
CWA?
C. FSSC Argument: The Court Erroneously Determined
That Capitol City Did Not Violate the Requirement
of 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) Because the Rapid River is a
Navigable Water.
1. A Tributary of a Navigable Water Constitutes a
Navigable Water for Purposes of the CWA.
As cited above, the EPA definition of "navigable waters" was
intended to reach the extent of the constitutional limits of the
commerce clause and it includes tributaries of "navigable waters."
Cal. ex rel. State Water Res. Control Bd. v. EPA, 511 F.2d 963 at
964. Courts have frequently held waters not traditionally consid-
ered "navigable in fact" to be navigable within EPA's definition
and thereby covered by the Clean Water Act. See, e.g., Quivira
Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
that because there is a surface connection between non-navigable
"arroyos" and creeks and navigable streams during periods of "in-
tense rainfall" such waterways affect interstate commerce); Re-
sidents Against Indus. Landfill Expansion v. Diversified Systems,
Inc., 804 F. Supp. 1036, 1039 (E.D. Tenn. 1992) (finding that
tributaries of creeks constitute navigable waters under the Clean
Water Act); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp.
1181, 1187 (D. Ariz. 1975) (holding that "navigable waters" under
the CWA include waterways within the United States "including
normally dry arroyos through which water may flow, where such
water will ultimately end up in public waters such as a river or
stream, tributary to a river or stream, lake, reservoir, bay, gulf,
sea or ocean either within or adjacent to the United
States)(emphasis added).
It has been determined that the vantage point from which a
waterway is to be classified as navigable is the time of statehood
rather than the present perspective. "When once found to be navi-
[Vol. 22414
44http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol22/iss2/5
BENCH MEMORANDUM
gable, a waterway remains so." United States v. Appalachian
Electric Power Co., 311. U.S. 377, 408 (1940). The Court there
also found that for a water way to be navigable it need not be con-
tinually used for navigation. Id. at 409. The Rapid River was his-
torically connected to the traditionally navigable Platte River.
Therefore, although it is no longer directly connected to it, as a
result of the Torpid Dam, it maintains its navigable character and
is thus subject to the CWA. Capitol City argues that because the
Appalachian Court was interpreting navigability in the tradi-
tional sense, rather than the navigability intended by Congress in
the instant case, its reasoning can not be presently applied. This
argument is flawed; although the Appalachian Court determined
navigability as navigable-in-fact, it also discussed the ability for
Congress to regulate navigable waters to the extent allowable
under the Commerce Clause. Id. at 404. Presently, the definition
of navigable waters envisioned by Congress when drafting the
CWA was the broadest allowable definition under the Constitu-
tion. See United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F.Supp. at
1187; Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 531 U.S. at 162. Therefore, the two cases can be reconciled,
and the reasoning from Appalachian that once found navigable,
always navigable, applies instantly.
It should also be noted that the water originating in the Rapid
River and filling the Torpid Reservoir is the water supply for Capi-
tol City. The fact that the water enters commerce via consump-
tion patterns in Capitol City, may be a further argument that the
Rapid River constitutes a navigable water when it is used as a
resource it may enter interstate commerce, or is at least connected
to interstate commerce.
2. Intermittent Streams, Connected to Navigable Waters,
Constitute Navigable Waters for Purposes of the CWA
In referring to the purpose of the CWA, the Quivira court
stated that "[ilt is the intent of the Clean Water Act to cover, as
much as possible, all waters of the United States instead of just
some. Quivira Mining Co. v. EPA, 765 F.2d 126, 129 (10th Cir.
1985) (citing Deltona Corp. v. United States, 657 F.2d 1184, 1186
(Ct. Cl. 1981)). The court in Quivira held that a permit was re-
quired for the discharge of a pollutant into a dry arroyo, which
periodically ran as a stream, because discharges into every creek,
stream, river, or body of water affecting interstate commerce are
regulated. Quivira 765 F.2d at 129. Because the purpose of the
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CWA directs a broad interpretation of "navigable waters" and the
holding in Quivira found that a dry arroyo constituted a navigable
water, the court in the present case should conclude that the
Rapid River is a navigable water. An arroyo is a dry ditch for
most of the year. It is inundated with water during portions of the
year when there is heavy rainfall. The court in Quivira reasoned
that although an arroyo is inundated only periodically throughout
the year, during such times of intense rainfall, the waters of the
arroyo have a surface connection with other navigable-in-fact wa-
ters and must therefore come within the jurisdiction of CWA
§ 401.
The question concerning the fact that the Rapid River flows
throughout the year is not in dispute. Surely, if a dry arroyo has a
surface connection during part of the year to navigable waters, so
too does the Rapid River that flows all year long. Even if it does
not have a direct surface connection to other navigable waters, it
has some impact on interstate commerce throughout the year, as
it feeds the water supply of the nearby city. See United States v.
Earth Scis., Inc., 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979) (holding that the
stream in question was a "water of the United States" even though
it was not navigable-in-fact because all that is needed is some im-
pact on interstate commerce from the stream).
D. Capitol City and New Union Argument: The Court
Properly Determined That Capitol City Did Not
Violate 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) Because the Rapid
River is Not a Navigable Water.
1. The Rapid River is No Longer a Tributary of the Platte
River and Will Never Be Again in the Foreseeable
Future; Therefore it Does Not Constitute a
Navigable Water.
FSSC relies on the outdated case of United States v. Appa-
lachian Electric Power Co., to support its argument that once a
water is found to be navigable it remains so, even after it becomes
unconnected to the waters of the United States. 311 U.S. 377, 408
(1940) This argument must fail as Congress did not intend to
regulate non-navigable waters that would not again be navigable
at any time in the future. The general rule is that isolated waters
that are separated from navigable waters are not subject to CWA
prohibition against discharge of pollutants. See Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S.
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159 (2001). Rather, for a waterway to be subject to the CWA pro-
hibition against point source pollution it must be used or usable
for navigation or connected, in some way, to navigable water. Id.
at 172.
The Congressional intent behind regulating tributaries of tra-
ditionally navigable waters under CWA was to control pollution of
the "navigable waters" by controlling the pollution on the non-nav-
igable upstream waterway, often a tributary. This intention is re-
flected in the congressional definition. Capitol City and New
Union concede that at one time the Rapid River was an indirect
tributary of the Platte River and therefore, was subject to CWA
jurisdiction. However, the Rapid River was dammed by the Tor-
pid Reservoir in 1934 to provide a drinking water supply to Capi-
tol City. As a consequence of the dam, the Rapid River has been
unconnected to navigable water for almost a century and as an
isolated waterway, is not subject to 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a).
In Appalachian the Court was not considering a river naviga-
ble because it was a tributary to navigable water but whether the
river itself was navigable. The Court held that "rivers must be
regarded as public navigable rivers in law which are navigable in
fact. And they are navigable in fact when they are used, or are
susceptible of being used in their ordinary condition, as highways
for commerce." United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co.,
107 F.2d 769, 780 (4th Cir. 1939) (citing The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S.
557, 563 (1870). As opposed to the navigable-in-fact meaning of
navigability there, presently, the meaning is entirely dependant
on the definition imposed by Congress in the CWA. For this rea-
son, the Appalachian interpretation can not be applied to the
meaning intended by Congress and argued presently, and there-
fore, although the Rapid River was once navigable, it has been cut
off from its connection to navigable waters and can not be inter-
preted as maintaining its navigable character.
2. The Rapid River is, at Best, a Formerly Intermittent
Navigable Water and Because it is No Longer
Annually Connected to Navigable Waters Flow it is
Not Subject to the CWA.
Plaintiffs further rely on the intermittent connection theory
to establish that the Rapid River is within the jurisdiction of the
CWA. The plaintiffs may not rely on Quivera because there the
arroyos in question were intermittently connected with navigable
waters on an annual basis during the rainy season. Here, because
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the Torpid Reservoir and Dam will be used into the foreseeable
future to supply drinking water to the local communities, such an-
nual inundation is not present. Rather, the Rapid River is com-
pletely disconnected from navigable waters as it ends in the
Torpid Reservoir and then is consumed by Capitol City.
"Discharge of a Pollutant"
Did the release of silt-laden water from the Torpid River to
the Rapid River through a diversion, constitute the "discharge of a
pollutant" under the CWA?
E. FSSC Argument: The Court Improperly Held That
Capitol City Did Not Violate the Permit
Requirement of the Act Because the Discharge of
Silt-laden Water From the Diversion Pipe Did
Constitute the "Discharge of a Pollutant."
1. The Transfer of Polluted Waters from One Waterbody to
Another by Way of a Discharge Through a Point-
source Violates CWA § 301 Prohibition on the
"Addition" of a "Pollutant" From a "Point Source"
to "Navigable Waters."
Read together, the statutory and regulatory language and as-
sociated definitions established by Congress and EPA under the
CWA encompass the transfer of polluted water from one water
body and the discharge into another water body through a pipe,
channel, tunnel, or conduit. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2004). A recent
Second Circuit opinion held that the transfer of water from one
water body to another through a "discrete conveyance" constitutes
a violation of CWA § 301 and therefore requires an NPDES permit
under CWA § 402. See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Un-
limited, Inc., v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2nd Cir. 2001).
There, the court held that the discharge of mud and silt through a
tunnel constituted the discharge of a pollutant from a point source
in violation of CWA § 301 and required an NPDES permit. Id. at
492. Presently, the diversion of silt-laden water from the Torpid
River to the Rapid River causes the "addition" of the polluted silt-
laden water via a discharge through a "discernible, confined, and
discrete conveyance," the diversion itself. 33 U.S.C. § 1362 (2004).
Were it not for the presence of the diversion of water from the silt-
laden Torpid River to the clear and rapid running Rapid River, the
Rapid River would remain unpolluted.
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In the recent Supreme Court decision South Florida Water
Management District v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, the Court
confronted the specific issue of whether a human induced transfer
of water, through a pump constituted the "discharge of [a] pollu-
tant" within the meaning of the CWA. 124 S. Ct. 1537, 1542
(2004). The court ultimately held that the definition of "discharge
of pollutant" includes "point sources that do not themselves gener-
ate pollutants." Id. at 1543. The court declined to rule on the
"unitary waters" theory and remanded the case on that question.
Of further significance is that the Gorsuch and Consumers
Power cases, relied on by the defendant were distinguished by the
First Circuit in Dubois v. USDA, 102 F.3d 1273 (1st Cir. 1996) and
also by the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains, 273 F.3d 481
(2nd Cir. 2001). In the Dubois case, water was transferred from a
river to a pond and that court held that the transfer constituted
an addition. 102 F.3d at 1299. Gorsuch and Consumers Power are
relied on by the defendant for the proposition that there is no "ad-
dition" of a pollutant unless the source of the addition "physically
introduces" the pollutant "from the outside world." Gorsuch 693
F.2d at 175. However, the discharges in both Gorsuch and the
Consumers Power were transferring pollutants within the same
body of water, rather than between two different bodies of water.
In distinguishing these cases, the Dubois court found that the
water in those cases was flowing within a single body of water, as
opposed the facts before it, where water was flowing "from one
flowing water body into another." 102 F.3d 1273, 1299 (1st Cir.
1996). The Dubois facts and holding should be applied to the pre-
sent case as there is no question that the Torpid River and the
Rapid River are separate and distinct bodies of water and the "ad-
dition" of the polluted silt-laden water into the Rapid River comes
from the outside world.
One further relevant case is that of Dague v. City of Burling-
ton where the Second Circuit held that a pollutant released from
one distinct water body into a another distinct water body consti-
tuted an addition of a pollutant. There a "discharge" of leachate
from a landfill that entered a nearby pond and then subsequently
entered a marshland via a culvert constituted the discharge of a
pollutant. 935 F.2d 1343, 1354 (2d Cir. 1991). Similarly, silt en-
ters the Torpid River, then enters the diversion and is added to
the Rapid River constituting a "discharge of a pollutant."
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2. The Structure and Legislative History of the CWA
Require the Conclusion That the Transfer Through a
Point Source From One Body of Water to Another
Body of Water Violates CWA § 301.
The respondents argue that the addition of silt-laden waters
into the Rapid River from the Torpid River is not an "addition" of a
pollutant because the silt-laden water was present in the Torpid
River and therefore has already been added to navigable waters.
This argument fails because it undermines the legislative intent
of the pollution prohibition of CWA § 301 and it is not supported
by statutory structure of the CWA.
The CWA aims "to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C.
§1251(a) (2004). The meaning of this goal is illustrated in the
House Committee on Public Works report that accompanied the
CWA Bill. The report states the following:
[t]he word "integrity" as used is intended to convey a concept
that refers to a condition in which the natural structure and
function of ecosystems is maintained... Any change induced by
man that overtaxes the ability of nature to restore conditions to
"natural" or "original" is an unacceptable perturbation.
H. R. Rep. No. 92-911, at 76-77 (1972).
Clearly, Congress intended to regulate the type of perturba-
tion in the waters of the United States that results from the diver-
sion of the silt-laden waters of the Torpid River to the clear
flowing waters of the Rapid River. The "change induced by man"
in the instant case involves the transfer of the diverted water and
the discharge of such water through a point source into the Rapid
River. The consequence of such man induced alteration of the
water system results in the inability of the Rapid River to restore
itself to its "original" condition and as a result fish are dying, and
humans are harmed in their attempt to use and enjoy the waters
and resources that would natural thrive in the waters.
In addition to contravening the purposes of the CWA, and ig-
noring its plain language, the respondent's "unitary waters" argu-
ment would disrupt the structure of the statute. The "unitary
waters" theory runs counter to the scheme designed to maintain
water quality and it also disrupts other provisions related dredged
spoil and materials. The structure of the CWA water quality
scheme functions on an individual water body basis, requiring
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states to adopt water quality standards for each water body in the
its state. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2004); see also 40 C.F.R. § 131.20
(2003). The distinct water body scheme for designated uses and
water quality standards accords with the Dubois, Dague, and Cat-
skills holdings cited above.
Besides water quality standards, application of the "unitary
waters" theory runs counter to other CWA provisions. For in-
stance, CWA § 404 requires a permit for the deposit of
"dredged.. .material" into navigable waters, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a).
CWA § 502 includes "dredged spoil" within the "pollutant" defini-
tion, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Both dredged material and dredge spoil
are materials removed from one body of water and are reintro-
duced into another water body or another part of the same water
body. Regardless of whether the materials are already present in
a navigable water, their deposit constitutes an "addition" and
therefore, such activity violates CWA § 301 without a permit. If
respondents' argument succeeds, these provisions would have new
meaning. For these reasons, the structure of the statute and its
subsequent application weigh heavily against the respondents'
"unitary waters" theory.
3. The Respondent's Argument Must Fail Under the
"Unitary Waters" Theory Because That Theory Has
Not Been Decided and Also Because the Rapid
River and the Torpid River are Distinguishable
Hydrologic Units.
Capitol City would have this court apply an undecided doc-
trine of law that has no solid origin in the legislative history of the
CWA. It is the contention of Capitol City that the court should
apply the "unitary waters" theory treating navigable waters as a
collective whole, thereby making it impossible to ever find more
than one "addition."
The Supreme Court in Miccosukee explicitly stated that the
statutory scheme of the CWA "suggests that the Act protects indi-
vidual water bodies as well as the "waters of the United States" as
a whole." 124 S.Ct. at 1544. The Court supported this conclusion
by citing the water quality scheme in general that isolates waters
on a water-body-by-water-body basis. Id. Because the Rapid
River and the Torpid River are distinctly separate water bodies,
exemplified by the fact that their connection now is through a
human construction diversion, the Miccosukee reasoning must
apply.
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F. Capitol City and New Union Argument: Even if the
Court Determines That the Rapid River is a
Navigable Water, the Court Properly Held That
Capitol City Did Not Violate the Requirement of
33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) Because the Discharge of Silt-laden
Water Did Not Constitute the "Discharge of a
Pollutant."
1. The Statutory Language of CWA § 402 Does Not Apply
to Diversions of Water Where There Has Been no
"Addition" of a Pollutant to Navigable Waters.
The statutory language indicates that, although there may be
multiple additions, multiple pollutants, and multiple point
sources, there is only one navigable water. Therefore the addition
of silt occurred when it was added to the navigable Torpid River,
not when the Torpid River was diverted to the Rapid River. The
definition of "discharge of pollutants" includes that there be "an
addition" of "any pollutant" from "a point source" to "navigable
waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2004). This language requires that
the point source in question be the source of the pollutants' initial
entry into navigable water. United States v. Riverside Bayview,
474 U.S. 121 (1985). Furthermore, once the court of appeals has
held that an "addition" of pollutants to navigable waters from a
point source "occurs only if the point source itself physically in-
troduces a pollutant into water from the outside world." National
Wildlife Found. v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Simi-
larly, in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Consumer Power, the court
held that water polluted with destroyed aquatic life and released
from the turbines of a dam did not constitute the addition of a
pollutant because such pollutant was merely being moved from
one location in navigable water to another. 862 F.2d 580 (1988).
Such release was not adding anything to the water. Id. These
cases suggest, but do not hold that a polluted water passing
through a point source from one body of navigable water to an-
other would constitute an addition. Gorsuch 693 F.2d at 175; Con-
sumers Power 862 F.2d at 586.
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2. The "Unified Waters" Theory Applies and Therefore, the
Diversion Does not Constitute an Addition as the
Addition Occurred Upstream as Non Point-Source
Runoff.
Even if the court finds that Gorsuch and Consumers Power
are distinguishable, the appellants' argument still fails under the
"unitary waters" theory. In its recent decision, the U.S. Supreme
Court remanded the "unitary waters" theory to be decided. The
theory espoused by the United States views all "waters of the
United States" as joined. The court should apply the "unitary wa-
ters" theory treating navigable waters as a collective whole,
thereby making it impossible to ever find more than one
"addition."
Because the language of CWA defines "discharge of a pollu-
tant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from
any point source" and such language does not modify the words
navigable waters with the word any, the plain meaning suggests
that only one navigable waters was envisioned.
3. As a Public Policy Matter Imposition of the NPDES
Permit System Requirements on Water Diversions
Would be Impractical and Burdensome for Western
States and Should be Avoided.
New Union and Capitol City contend the CWA does not regu-
late the alteration of water that occurs as a result of release or
diversion from every dam, reservoir, pipe, or tunnel. Such an im-
position would be highly burdensome on much of the west as a
result of the complex water supply and allocation implemented
through those arid states. FSSC contends that a general permit
could be utilized to avoid the administrative burden on such
states. This is not an adequate solution to the problems resulting
form imposition of the CWA on water diversions and inter-basin
transfers of waters. A general permit, although administratively
less taxing, still imposes a restriction on the right of the water
rights owner to divert the water right. Such restriction is prohib-
ited by the CWA § 101(g) prohibition against obviation of states
water allocation rights by the CWA.
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V. DID THE COURT BELOW ERR IN GRANTING
CAPITOL CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT THAT NEW UNION'S GRANTING
OF A PERMIT FOR CAPITOL CITY'S
DIVERSION OF THE TORPID RIVER TO THE
RAPID RIVER AS PART OF THE STATE'S
CONTROL OVER WATER OWNERSHIP, USE AND
ALLOCATION OBVIATED APPLICATION OF THE
FEDERAL CLEAN WATER ACT TO THE
DIVERSION?
Did the Court below err in granting Capitol City's motion for
summary judgment that New Union's granting of a permit for
Capitol City's diversion of the Torpid River to the Rapid River as
part of the State's control over water ownership, use and alloca-
tion obviated application of the federal Clean Water Act to the di-
version? FSSC appeals the Court's decision; Capitol City and New
Union support it?
A. Relevant Statutory and Regulatory Language.
The CWA preserves to the states in CWA § 101(g) authority to
allocate water quantity and water rights. The provision describes
as follows:
It is the policy of Congress that the authority of each State to
allocate quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be
superseded, abrogated or otherwise impaired by this Act, 33
U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. It is the further policy of Congress that
nothing in this Act shall be construed to supersede or abrogate
rights to quantities of water which have been established by any
State. Federal agencies shall co-operate with State and local
agencies to develop comprehensive solutions to prevent, reduce
and eliminate pollution in concert with programs for managing
water resources.
33 U.S.C. § 1251(g)(2004).
Additionally, CWA § 510, State Authority, directs the follow-
ing "Except as expressly provided in this chapter, nothing in this
chapter shall... be construed as impairing or in any manner af-
fecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with respect to the
waters.. .of such States."33 U.S.C. § 1370
The CWA provides that where an applicant can demonstrate
that the cost and benefit of a water quality standard are not re-
lated, relief to the permit applicant will be granted.
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The Administrator, with the concurrence of the State, may issue
a permit which modifies the effluent limitations required by
subsection (a) of this section for pollutants other than toxic pol-
lutants if the applicant demonstrates at such hearing that there
is no reasonable relationship between the economic and social
costs and the benefits to be obtained from achieving such
limitation.
33 U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A).
CWA § 101(g) is commonly referred to as the "Wallop Amend-
ment" as it was Senator Wallop that sponsored the amendment in
1977. In the legislative history of the amendment, Senator Wallop
stated that CWA § 101(g) should not "take precedence over legiti-
mate and necessary water quality considerations." 123 CONG.
REC. 39, 212 (1977), 1977 Leg. Hist. 532. Referencing this legisla-
tive history, the Supreme Court stated that the 1977 amendment
adding CWA § 101(g) did not intend to prohibit incidental effects
of the requirements of the Act on individual water rights, but to
"insure that state allocation systems are not subverted and that
any effects on individual rights are prompted by legitimate and
necessary water quality standards." PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Coun-
try v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700, 734 (1994).
B. The Federal-State Tension over Water Rights.
The issues of Federalism that have existed in the United
States since the early days of its inception are apparent and con-
tinually debated in the problems that arise between state rights to
allocate water and the federal government's authority to prevent
pollution of navigable waters.
Courts have found that the federal interest in protecting the
nation's waters and the state interest in providing water to its citi-
zens are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that federal regu-
lation does not wholly preclude state allocation. See Alameda
Water & Sanitation District v. Reilly, 930 F. Supp. 486, (D. Colo,
1996)(holding that a challenge to the EPA's veto of a water storage
project must fail where the water entities argued that that EPA
had violated 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) prohibiting interference with
state allocation laws regarding water quantity, because EPA did
nothing to prevent city or other water rights owners from using or
transferring their rights); James City County v. EPA, 12 F.3d
1330 (4th Cir. 1993)(finding that EPA has the authority to base its
veto under the CWA solely on grounds of adverse effects to the
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environment; the agency need not consider the local need for
water).
C. FSSC Argument: The Court Below Erred in Finding
That New Union's Permit Grant Allowing Capitol
City to Divert Water Obviated Application of the
CWA.
1. CWA § 101(g) Contemplates Considerable Federal
Regulation of Water Quality.
Congress has assigned considerable responsibility for the im-
plementation of CWA water quality protection programs to the
states, with guidance, oversight, and cooperative certification of
the federal government. It is not disputed that Congress has di-
rected that federal authority must not "supercede or abrogate
rights to quantities of water." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g). However, cou-
pled with this directive, is the language that "[f]ederal agencies
shall co-operate with State and local agencies to develop compre-
hensive solutions to prevent, reduce and eliminate pollution in
concert with programs for managing water resources." Id. (em-
phasis added). Based on this language, it is clear that state au-
thority does not wholly obviate the application of federal law to
state waters where allocation schemes are in place. Rather, the
federal government and state agencies must work together to en-
sure that water quality is maintained while providing adequate
water supply to the current and future citizens of the states.
There is substantial case law indicating that state authority
to allocate water does not preclude federal authority to implement
the NPDES permit program to protect water quality. The U.S.
Supreme Court held that CWA water quality requirements may
affect some characteristic of the water allocation schemes, specifi-
cally the way a particularly affected water right is managed. PUD
No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S.
700 (1994). The Court there found the distinction between water
quality and water quantity control: "reduced stream flow, i.e.,
diminishment of water quantity, can constitute water pollution.
Appellate courts have also come to the conclusion that the
Wallop Amendment does not limit water restrictions on the exer-
cise of water rights, provided that the restriction serves a legiti-
mate purpose under the CWA and does not abrogate the
underlying water right or water allocation system.
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2. Any Burden to Western States as a Result of Federal
Regulation Under CWA § 401 Can be Remedied by a
General Permit and Such Federal Regulation is
Consistent With State Water Allocation Schemes.
The Supreme Court in Miccosukee noted that the administra-
tive burden that could likely result from imposition of the NPDES
program on diversions could be remedied by the general permit
system under the CWA. 124 S.Ct. at 1545. Furthermore, Capitol
City contends that the quality of general permits has been ques-
tioned. However, the court in Environmental Defense Center v.
EPA, 344 F. 3d 832 (9th Cir. 2002), stated that general permits
are lawful and adequate.
Capitol City contends that the administrative burden created
by imposition of CWA to diversions is overly burdensome. Any ad-
ministrative difficulty that results can be remedied by the general
permit program. However, it is important to note that adminis-
trative burden is not a valid reason to avoid application of the
CWA where there is a "discharge of pollutant."
The last argument espoused by Capitol City is that the cost of
imposing technology based effluent limitations or water quality
standards on waters and discharges within the allocation scheme
was outside Congress' vision for CWA application. However, Con-
gress specifically recognized that some cost burden may come to
bear on permit applicants and is reflected in the statute itself.
The CWA contemplates that cost will be a factor in the technology
based effluent limitations, CWA § 304, and water quality scheme
and therefore such costs may be balanced against the benefits. 33
U.S.C. § 1312(b)(2)(A). If the permit applicant can make a show-
ing that the costs do outweigh the benefits, than the permit may
be avoided. Since Congress not only recognized the likelihood of a
cost burden but set out a means by which permit applicants could
avoid such costs, the court hear must not make a sweeping hold-
ing exempting all diversions from CWA regulation. Rather, costly
impositions that result from CWA imposition on diversions must
be dealt with one diversion at time.
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D. Capitol City and New Union: The Court Below
Properly Found That New Union's Permit Grant For
Capitol City to Divert Water as Part of the New
Union's State Control Over Water Ownership,
Use and Allocation Obviated Application of the CWA.
1. Application of CWA § 401 Permitting Requirements to
Diversions Will Be Overly Burdensome on Western
States and Inconsistent With the State Authority to
Allocate Water Quantities.
Although the Court in Miccosukee did not directly decide the
matter, it verified New Union's contention here that if the NPDES
program proscribes transfers of water for allocation purposes, the
CWA § 101(g) will be violated. Capitol City and New Union con-
tend that the provision will be violated in two primary ways, 1) by
economically impairing the State right to allocate water quality,
and 2) by being generally inconsistent with the purpose and inten-
tion underlying the provision. In Miccosukee the Court empha-
sized the possibility that if the NPDES program prohibits water
transfers, such as the diversion made presently from the Torpid
River to the Rapid River, that the costs of water may be prohibi-
tively increased and thereby frustrating the state's authority to
control its water uses protected by CWA § 101(g). Miccosukee at
1545. The cost of treating pollution in every diversion in the west,
and specifically the diversion at issue here, directly abrogates the
State's authority to allocate water and violates CWA § 101(g).
2. The Administrative Solution of General Permits is not
Appropriate as it Also Infringes on the State's
Authority to Control Water Ownership, Use and
Allocation.
In relying on Miccosukee, the appellants suggest the adminis-
trative remedy of general permits to alleviate the chaos and bur-
den that may result if every diversion is subject to CWA
regulation. 124 S.Ct at 1545 (recommending that if water trans-
fers must be regulated to protect water quality, the associated cost
could be controlled through the general permit system). While it
may be true that a general permit would reduce the burdensome
nature of the envisioned permitting scheme by requiring only one
permit or a small number of permits, rather than permits for
every diversion, it does require that states meet an effluent limita-
tion for such diversions. The regulations mandate that a general
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permit must include effluent limitations to "[a]cheive water qual-
ity standards." 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1). Therefore, regardless of
whether it is CWA § 401 NPDES permit or a general permit under
the regulations, either scheme will abrogate the State's right to
allocate quantities of water, to some degree. Such abrogation was
not envisioned by either CWA § 101(g) or CWA § 510 and therefore
application of CWA has been properly obviated.
Another important point regarding the use of general permits
was the holding in the recent the 9th Circuit decision that stated
general permits for municipal stormwater systems do not properly
ensure that the CWA requirements are met. Environmental De-
fense Center v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832, 855-856 (9th Cir. 2002). Since
NPDES permits abrogate State authority and general permits
don't do enough to ensure water quality, and alternative approach
is required. The result for the present circumstance is that the
Court below properly upheld New Union's permitting that allowed
Capitol City to divert water from the Torpid River to the Rapid
River for water supply purposes.
Last, even if the administrative burden can be remedied
through the general permit scheme, the cost of meeting NPDES
limitations or water quality standards outweighs the benefit that
would be realized through regulation of diversions. Congress did
not intend to burden private water rights through additional costs
by imposition of the CWA on the allocation scheme extensively
used in much of the United States. For these reasons, the FSSC
arguments below must fail.
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